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IS THE INTER-BANK MARKET OUT OF
CONTROL?: DUNN & DELTA v. COMMODITY
FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
I. INTRODUCrION
On February 25th, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of
Dunn & Delta Consultants v. Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion,' which addressed the scope of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission's (CFTC) regulatory authority. The main issue was
whether the "Treasury Amendment" to the Commodity Exchange Act
exempts off-exchange traded options on foreign currency from the
jurisdiction of the CFTC. The case not only called into question the
validity of billions of dollars in foreign currency contracts, but could
have ultimately decided the fate of America's commodity exchanges.
A unanimous Supreme Court took a plain language approach to the
issue and decided in favor of Dunn & Delta Consultants, holding that
the CFTC did not have jurisdiction. The court proceeded to then use the
legislative history of the Commodity Exchange Act to further justify its
holding.
For decades, the world's largest banks and professional currency
traders, presumably have traded foreign currency contracts outside the
regulatory framework of the CFTC.2 The traders were relying on sec-
tion 2(ii) of the Commodities Exchange Act of 1936, otherwise referred
to as the "Treasury Amendment," which stated to the effect that the
1. 117 S. Ct. 913 (1997).
2. See Joanne Morrison, Regulation: High Court Case May Clarify CFTC's Power over
OTC Foreign Exchange Markets, THE BOND BUYER, May 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL
5638959 at *2.
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CFTC did not have jurisdiction over "transactions in foreign currency"
not traded on a board of trade.
Since the Supreme Court was allowed to decide this issue,4 it was
correct, as this note contends, in holding that options contracts on for-
eign currency are "transactions in foreign currency" for purposes of the
Treasury Amendment. However, the Court should have also held that
this issue alone is not dispositive of the case, and further concluded that
the marketing activities of the defendants entitled the CFTC to jurisdic-
tion over them, a result consistent with the legislative intent of the
CEA.
The case of Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission
focused on the regulation of financial derivatives markets. Derivatives
are contracts, and at times securities, whose value is derived from the
future price of an underlying financial asset. Derivative products are not
wealth creating-their function is to allocate risk. The common term
used to describe derivatives is that they are a zero sum game, that is,
where the gain of one party is the loss of another. This is unlike the
stock market where on any given day there can be more winners than
losers, or vice-versa.5
In the United States, derivatives are either traded on an exchange
or in the over-the-counter market (OTC).6 Exchange traded derivatives
are comparatively small standardized contracts traded on the floor of an
exchange. On an exchange traded derivative, the counter-party to the
transaction is always the exchange.7 In the OTC derivatives market, the
contracts are very customized and typically very large. Additionally,
3. 7 U.S.C § 2 (1994).
4. See Fred Vogelstein, Two Futures Trading Bills Aim to Fix Problems, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 23. 1996, at C14. There are currently two bills being proposed to the legislature:
The first bill, proposed by Senators Richard Lugar (R., Ind.) and Patrick
Leahy (D., Vt.), the chairman and ranking minority member, respectively, of
the Senate Agriculture Committee, would ease federal regulation of U.S.
commodity exchanges in hopes of making it easier for them to compete with
rapidly growing exchanges abroad .... A provision that would give regula-
tors power over nonexchange-traded futures may be added next year, when
the bulk of the debate on the bill is expected to take place. The second bill,
proposed by Rep. Charles Schumer (D., N.Y.), would give the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission authority to regulate non-U.S. commodity con-
tracts if they provided for delivery of the commodity in the U.S.
Id. Additionally, the Treasury Department and the CFTC are attempting to work out an agree-
ment in regards to the regulation of off-exchange futures and options contracts. Should any of
these efforts be successful, then the case would be rendered moot.
5. See generally Bernard Karol & Mary Lehman, Unprecedented Technological and
Mathematical Sophistication Has Created a Vast Market for Derivatives, REVIEW OF SECURI-
TIES & COMMODrrmS REGuLATIoN, July 1, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2257245 at *1.
6. See id.
7. See id. at *3.
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dealers match trades for their clients, and often trade for their own
account. However, since there is no clearinghouse in the OTC market,
there is significant credit risk from the counter-party should they lose
money and not be able to "cover" their losses. There is no exchange
floor in the OTC because the OTC has no physical existence; it is
merely a network of computers connecting traders.
A. What are Commodity Futures and Options Contracts?
A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell a specific amount
of a commodity (e.g., metals, grains, pork etc.) at a particular price in a
stipulated future month. A futures contract obligates the parties to per-
form unless one or both of the parties sells or trades the contract. A
similar financial tool is the forward contract which has the same basic
features as a futures contract. The principal practical difference is that
forward contracts are generally much smaller in price and quantity.
Forward contracts are usually very unique to the purchaser, so they are
not easily traded. Futures contracts, however, are more easily traded
and are thus more favored by the large institutions and professional
traders!
An options contract allows the buyer the right (but no obligation)
to purchase (call option) or the right to sell (put option) a given quanti-
ty of the cash security at a specific "strike" price for a specified period
of time.9 The strike price of an option is the trade price for the asset if
the option is exercised. The strike price distinguishes an option from a
futures contract, and results in an initial cost premium over the current
8. See JOHN DOwNEs & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, FINANCE & INVESTMENT HANDBOOK
27 (3d ed. 1990). The futures markets are broadly divided into two categories of participants:
(1) hedgers, who have a position in the underlying commodity and use futures to create coun-
tervailing positions, thus protecting against loss due to price changes; (2) speculators, who do
not own the underlying asset for commercial or investment purposes, but instead aim to capi-
talize on the ups and downs of the contracts themselves. It is the speculators who provide the
liquidity essential to the efficient operation of the futures markets.
The great majority of futures contracts are closed out before their expiration-
or delivery-date. This is done by buying or selling an offsetting contract. It is
vital to note that with futures, in contrast to options, the alternative to an
offset is a delivery, though this is done with title documentation .... not by
the legendary dumping of pork bellies on the front steps of absentminded
contract holders. When the future is a contract to buy value, delivery of the
future is avoided by buying an offsetting future to sell.
Id. at 610-611.
9. See HAIM LEVY & MARSHALL SARNAT, CAPITAL INVESTMENT & FINANCIAL DECI-
SIONS, (5th ed. 1994). "A call option is a right (but not an obligation) to buy a given number of
shares of the underlying stock at a given price (striking price) on or before a specific date (the
expiration date)." Id. at 610 (emphasis added). "A put option is a right (but not an obligation)
to sell a given number of shares of the underlying commodity at a specified price on or before
a specific date." Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
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value of the option. Options also have a limited loss feature (assuming
a covered position), unlike futures contracts.10
A cursory look at the history of the futures and options markets
reveals their primary use and function, as well as the reasons for their
sudden growth in popularity. American futures markets were formally
started in Chicago in the mid 1800's as a means of hedging agricultural
products such as wheat." Before the Chicago markets existed, farmers
would dump wheat in the city streets due to plummeting prices caused
by excess supply after the harvest. The futures contracts provided the
farmers with price certainty and passed the risk of low prices on to
speculators and traders. Regulation of the futures market began with the
Grain Futures Act of 1922 and the Commodity Exchange Act of
1936.12
Options on stocks were created and traded by OTC dealers prior to
1973, then in that year the Chicago Board Option Exchange (CBOE)
began trading call options on individual stocks. The advantage the
CBOE offered was that the contracts purchased could be resold at any
time, unlike the OTC options which were not easily traded once they
were purchased due to valuation problems. 
3
Futures markets are important because they can alleviate fluctua-
tions in interest rates, currency values, stock prices and other variables
that cause major problems for financial executives. Futures markets also
provide institutions and firms with the necessary tools to manage their
10. See ROBERT T. DAIGLER, FINANCIAL FUTURES & OPTIONS MARKETS: CONCEPTS AND
STRATEGIES 3 (1994).
11. See id. at 4. "Viable futures markets were developed in Chicago because of its location
as the principle transportation center for wheat, corn, and other agricultural products from the
Midwest.... Location also became important for cotton futures, which began trading in New
York in 1872. Id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 5. The dealers of options could not value the contracts accurately until 1973,
the year Black and Scholes published their model for determining the fair value for options. In
the years prior to 1973, the dealers would just price the option contracts so high so as to tilt the
prospects of profiting in favor of the dealers. The Black and Scholes formula is still widely
used by both academics and practitioners. The Black and Scholes formula gives the price of a
current call (Co) by :
q - S0N(d)-Exe"N(d,)
Where:
S- - current stock price
Ex - exercise price
e - base of natural logarithms = 2.7128
r = continuously compounded annual riskless rate of interest
t - remaining time to expiration of the call expressed as a fraction
of a year




risk of cash positions by cheaply changing their risk profiles. 4 Options
markets can provide many of the same advantages as futures markets.
Additionally, option contracts can provide a protection from price loss
while allowing upward gains, but the options user must pay for this
protection. 5
The growth of futures and options has boomed in the past twenty
years. Trading volume is estimated to be ten times what it was in 1976.
Businesses today see the use of futures and options as an element of
daily business. General Motors Corporation, Harvard University, and
Goldman Sachs routinely hedge their exposure to other markets through
futures and options.
16
B. History of Commodity Futures Regulation
The CFTC was created by Congress in 1974 while re-engineering
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA).' The CFTC replaced
the Commodity Exchange Authority and was also given a much broader
mandate.'" The CFTC is allowed to regulate: contract markets on
which futures contracts are traded; the brokerage houses that place
futures contract orders for customers; and floor brokers who are directly
engaged in the execution of those futures contract orders. Additionally
the CFTC regulates the introduction of brokers, persons associated with
introducing brokers, commodity pool operators, commodity trading
advisors, persons associated with commodity trading advisors, and
registered futures associations. Leverage contracts were also brought
under the CFTC jurisdiction."
The regulatory power of the CFTC is set forth in § 2(a)(1) of the
CEA.2' In this section the term "commodity" is defined to include "all
other goods and articles ... and all services, rights, and interests in
which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt
14. See LEVY & SARNAT, supra note 9, at 632. Consider a multinational firm of exporters
who are involved in international trade. An American who sells products to Germany will get
his income according to the term of the sales agreement 30 days from now. However, since his
sales are in German marks, his income in dollars is a random variable reflecting the future
unknown exchange rate. If the German mark declines vis-a-vis the dollar, his dollar income will
decline. To protect himself against such events, the American investor can buy a call option to
buy the U.S. dollar (or a put option to sell German marks). Id.
15. See DAIGLER, supra note 10, at 7. Options contracts require the buyer to pay the seller
of the option a "premium," which represents the value of the contract, based on a Black and
Scholes analysis.
16. See Vogelstein, supra note 4.
17. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat.
1389 (1974) (as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
18. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6d, 6k, 21.
19. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6c, 23.
20. See id. § 2(a)(1).
19971
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. [Vol. 4:305
in," as well as specified agricultural products." Thus, the CFTC has
the authority to regulate all futures trading in the United States markets,
regardless of the underlying commodity.' The breadth of the CFTC's
jurisdiction is better understood when the expanded definition of com-
modity is also read in conjunction with the exclusive jurisdiction clause,
found in § 2(a)(1), which provides that:
the CFTC shall have exclusive jurisdiction, except to the extent otherwise
provided in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph, with respect to accounts,
agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is com-
monly known to the trade as, an "option"... ), and transactions involving
contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a
contract market designated pursuant to section 5 of this Act or any other
board of trade, exchange, or market... '
21. Id. Although originally the subject of some debate, it now appears clear that this defi-
nition makes any good or article a commodity, regardless of whether that good or article is the
subject of futures trading, but makes services, rights, and interests commodities only if futures
contracts are traded on them. See S. Rep. No. 850, 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 27 (1978), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 92 Stat. 865.
22. Prior to the 1974 Act, the CEA provided that:
The word "commodity" shall mean wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye,
flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter, eggs, onions, Solarium tuberosum
(Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops, fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cot-
tonseed oil, peanut oil, soybean oil and all other fats and oils), cottonseed
meal, cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock
products, and frozen concentrated orange juice...
7 U.S.C. § 2.
23. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1), as amended by Futures Trading Act of 1982, § 101, Pub. L. No. 97-
444, 96 Stat 2294 (1983)(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). The breadth of
the language in the exclusive jurisdiction provision may be attributable, at least in part, to the
congressional desire to insure that there were no gaps in the regulation of commodity futures,
commodity options, or other commodities-related instruments. The pertinent portions of §
2(a)(1) of the CEA read in their entirety as follows:
Provided, that the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction, except to the
extent otherwise provided in subparagraph B of this paragraph, with respect to
accounts, agreements (including any transaction which is of the character of,
or is commonly known to the trade as, an "option," "privilege," indemnity,"
"bid," "offer," "put," "call,. "advance guaranty," or "decline guaranty"), and
transactions involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery,
traded or executed on a contract market designated pursuant to section 5 of
this Act or any other board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions
subject to regulation by the Commission pursuant to section 19 of this Act;
and provided further, That, except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained
in this section shall (i) supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time con-
ferred on the Securities and Exchange Commission or other regulatory author-
ities under the laws of the United States or of any State, or (ii) restrict the
Securities and Exchange Commission and such other authorities from carrying
out their duties and responsibilities in accordance with such laws. Nothing in
this section shall supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the
United States or any State. Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or
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This section gives a "single expert agency" the responsibility for devel-
oping a "regulatory framework for the futures and options industry."24
Given the broad language in § 2(a)(1) of the CEA, several clauses
were added to clarify the CFTC's jurisdiction. One such clause was
added by the Senate Agriculture Committee in response to urging from
the Department of Treasury,' which states that:
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applicable to
transactions in foreign currency, security warrants, security rights, resales of
installment loan contracts, repurchase options, government securities, or mort-
gages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless such transactions involve
the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.26
This clause is usually referred to as the "Treasury Amendment." The
Treasury department was concerned that the CFTC would try to regu-
late foreign exchange trading between banks, and the amendment was
designed to exclude the inter-bank market,27 which the Treasury De-
partment felt did not need regulation because inter-bank market partici-
pants "are sophisticated and informed institutions."'  The Treasury
Department was of the opinion that the CFTC did not have the exper-
tise to regulate this "complex banking function" and "would confuse an
already highly regulated business sector."29 The Treasury Department
urged the Senate Committee to make clear that the CFTC would have
no authority to regulate transactions in foreign currencies or the other
enumerated instruments, unless those transactions occurred on organized
in any way be applicable to transactions in foreign currency, security war-
rants, security rights, resales of installment loan contracts, repurchase options,
government securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, un-
less such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery conducted
on a board of trade. The term "future delivery" as used herein, shall not in-
clude any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery.
Id.
24. 120 Cong. Rec. 30, 459 (statement of Sen. Talmadge, indicating that the 1974 Act was
designed to insure that affected entities-exchanges, traders, customers, etc.-would not be subject
to conflicting agency rulings); S. Rep. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 92 Stat. 865.
25. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5843, 5887.
26. 7 U.S.C. § 2. Congress adopted virtually without change the language recommended by
the Treasury Department. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 25, at 5889. In an enforcement
action under CEA § 14(d), 7 U.S.C. § 18(d), the CFTC did have jurisdiction to decide whether
an account executive violated the CEA and CFTC rules by trading ahead, but it violated Article
II of the United States Constitution for the CFTC to hear counterclaims not relating to the
CEA or the regulations. Id.
27. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, supra note 25.
28. Id. at 5888.
29. Id.
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exchanges. 0 Despite the legislative history, there is still much litiga-
tion concerning the scope of CFTC's jurisdiction.
II. THE CASE LAW
The exact scope of the CFTC's jurisdiction has been the subject of
much debate. In Chicago Board of Trade v. Securities Exchange Com-
mission,1 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to decide
on who had regulatory jurisdiction over option contracts on Government
National Mortgage Association (GNMA) Securities.32 The court con-
strued the legislative history to read that the CFTC had exclusive juris-
diction over option contracts. However, the Treasury Amendment was
not at issue. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the
CFTC's jurisdictional reach with regards to the Treasury Amendment
in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. American Board of
Trade?3 The court held that option contracts on foreign currency were
not "transactions in foreign currency," for purposes of the Treasury
Amendment's exclusion to jurisdiction. Thus, the court held that the
CFTC had jurisdiction over options contracts on foreign currency.34
The Dunn case arose in the Second Circuit and the appeals court fol-
lowed its own previous interpretation from American Board of Trade,
and stated that the CFTC had jurisdiction over Dunn and Delta Consul-
tants, even though American Board of Trade was distinguishable on the
fact that the events occurred on an exchange.35 In the Dunn case, the
events took place off-exchange, but the Court of Appeals saw no reason
to distinguish between on-exchange and off-exchange.36
A sharply different view was reached by the 4th Circuit in Salomon
Forex v. Tauber.3 Dr. Laszlo Tauber was a private trader, who would
negotiate individual futures and options contracts with banks and large
companies. Dr. Tauber had personally traded over 2700 foreign curren-
cy contracts worth billions of dollars. Salomon Forex was the counter-
party on one particular trade with Dr. Tauber, and when the market
30. See id.
31. 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated, 459 U.S. 1026 (1982).
32. See DOWNEs & GOODMAN, supra note 8. GNMA is an acronym for the Government
National Mortgage Association, also nicknamed Ginnie Mae. GNMA is an agency of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development. GNMA guarantees, with the full faith and credit
of the United States Government, full and timely payment of all monthly principle and interest
payments on the mortgage-backed pass-through securities of registered holders. Id.
33. 803 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir. 1986).
34. See id. at 1248.
35. See id. at 1241.
36. See generally Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission 58 F.3d 50 (2nd Cir.
1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 913 (1997).
37. 8 F.3d 966 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1540 (1994).
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moved sharply, Dr. Tauber lost over $26 million. 8 Salomon Forex
demanded payment, but Dr. Tauber refused and Salomon Forex brought
suit.39 The issue at trial was whether the CEA applied to individually
negotiated sales of foreign currency futures and options that were off
organized exchanges.' Dr. Tauber argued that since the transactions
did not follow CEA guidelines, they were illegal and he should not be
responsible. Dr. Tauber cited the American Board of Trade ruling
where the CFTC was found to have jurisdiction over foreign currency
futures and options contracts.41 The District Court ruled that the trans-
actions were exempt from the jurisdiction of the CEA by the Treasury
Amendment.42 The Appeals Court affirmed and stated that the legisla-
tive history indicated that "all off-exchange transactions in foreign
currency, including futures and options, are exempted from regulation
by the CEA.43 This particular holding is directly counter to the Second
Circuit because it holds that options are "transactions in foreign curren-
cy" for purposes of the Treasury Amendment. Dr. Tauber also argued
that even if futures and options were "transactions in foreign currency,"
that the amendment was only to be applied to the banks and institu-
tions, rather than individuals.' To this the court responded by stating
"[i]t is the nature of the trade ... , not the corporate form of the trader,
that determines whether a trade is within the CEA."'4 The court went
on to distinguish American Board of Trade and Chicago Board of
Trade, by stating that those cases dealt only with exchange trading on
behalf of the general public, not individual, large scale deals between
professionals. '
III. DUNN & DELTA CONSULTANTS V. CFTC
In this case, the CFTC sued four defendants: (i) William C. Dunn;
(ii) Delta Consultants, a New Jersey corporation formed and solely
owned by Dunn; (iii) Delta Options, Ltd., a Bahamian company to
which Dunn is both managing director and advisor; and (iv) Nopkine
38. See 8 F.3d 966, 969. Additionally, Dr. Tauber owned a foreign currency trading com-
pany, held a seat on the nation's largest foreign currency exchange, and was estimated to be
worth over half a billion dollars. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 970.
41. See id. at 973.
42. See id. at 969.
43. See 8 F.3d 966, 976.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 977.
46. Id. at 978.
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Co., Ltd., a British Virgin Islands company., to which Dunn was an
advisor.47
The case begins in 1992, when some of the defendants were solic-
iting investments from individuals, partnerships, and companies. The
potential investors were told that Delta Options was going to use their
money to execute investment strategies involving the purchase and sale
of call and put options on various foreign currencies. The defendants
were using trading techniques with various names such as "strangles"
and "boxes".' These techniques were executed with the intent of gain-
ing abnormal returns for the investors. The trades were executed in the
name of the defendants and no options were sold directly to the inves-
tors. 
49
The defendants executed their strategies in the OTC market.'0
When trading is done OTC, it means that it was not done on an orga-
nized exchange (i.e., New York Stock Exchange, Chicago Board of
Trade, Pacific Exchange, etc.). In this instance the defendants were
using the inter-bank market (also known as the OTC in this instance) to
execute their trades. The inter-bank market is a system of bank and
professional traders who negotiate deals among themselves when form-
ing the futures and options contracts. There is no standard agreement
forms, as all terms are negotiated.5
According to affidavits submitted to the CFTC, Dunn and his com-
panies were deceiving investors about the risks of currency trading in
general, as well as the risks involved with the strategies being imple-
mented by the defendants. The defendants were also deceiving investors
as to the value and success of their accounts. Delta Options would send
their investors printouts of their accounts showing impressive returns
and ask the investor if they would like to re-invest, and usually they
would.52
During the latter part of 1993, investors were starting to get vague
communications from Defendants concerning investor accounts. Delta
Options began pushing back client maturity dates on their positions and
thus prevent the clients from receiving their alleged account balance. In
47. See Dunn, 58 F.3d 50, 51 (2nd Cir. 1995), rev'd 117 S.Ct. 913 (1997).
48. See DAIGLER, supra note 10. A box spread is a combination of two calls with different
strike prices and two puts with strike prices equivalent to the calls. All options have the same
expiration date. This combination is called a box spread because the options traded form the
four comers of a box when the call and put option prices are placed next to each other. A stran-
gle strategy consists of an equal number of put options and call options on the same underlying
commodity at the same strike price and maturity date. Id.
49. See 117 S. Ct. at 915.
50. See id.
51. See Karol & Lehman, supra note 5, at *5.
52. See Dunn, 58 F. 3d at 52.
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November, the defendants sent out notices to investors stating that they
would not be able to repay the investor's money, due to losses set at
$95 million.53
Apparently, Defendants had engaged in a "Ponzi" scheme. By
sending the printouts to the investors, the investors were inclined to
keep their money in the investment because they thought they were
making great returns. When an investor wanted to withdraw from the
investment, they would be paid with funds from new investors or those
who re-invested. At some point, losses from the trades were so great
that the defendants could no longer pay the investors who wanted to
withdrawal.' Additionally, $19.5 million was mysteriously transferred
to an account in Switzerland.55
The CFTC commenced their action on April 5, 1994. The CFTC
applied for and received a restraining order, freezing the Defendant's
assets. On May 4, 1994, the CFTC requested an appointment of a tem-
porary receiver, the Defendants argued that there was no subject matter
jurisdiction because the CFTC had no power to regulate options on
foreign currency, so the defendants were outside the CFTC's jurisdic-
tion. The trial court held for the CFTC and appointed a receiver.5 6
The central issue in the case was whether the CFTC had the power
to regulate options in foreign currency. This turned on whether trading
in off-exchange options on foreign currencies is excluded from the
CFTC's jurisdiction by the Treasury Amendment of 1974P7 which
reads in pertinent part:
Nothing in this chapter shall be deemed to govern or in any way be applica-
ble to transactions in foreign currency ... , unless such transactions involve
the sale thereof for future delivery conducted on a board of trade.S
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed what they termed was
"clear precedent," and held that the phrase "transactions in foreign cur-
rency" does not include options, even options traded off-exchange.59
The court was relying on the American Board of Trade case, which
provided the court's reasoning that an option was simply the right to
engage in a transaction in the future. Until this right matured, there was
no exempt "transaction."' The exercise of an option would constitute




56. See id. at 53.
57. See 7 U.S.C. § 2.
58. 7 U.S.C. § 2(ii).
59. See Dunn, 58 F.3d at 53.
60. See id.
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tion itself would not be such a "transaction" under the Treasury
Amendment. Thus, the trial court's decision that the CFTC had juris-
diction was affirmed.1
The court did note that their interpretation of the phrase "transac-
tions in foreign currency" was in conflict with the 4th Circuit's inter-
pretation in Salomon Forex.
The court responded by stating, "the conflict was for the Supreme
Court to resolve."62
A. What was at Stake in Dunn & Delta Consultants v. CFTC?
Had the court overturned Salomon Forex, the enforceability of
hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign currency contracts would have
become suspect.' The inter-bank market essentially matches parties to
a trade, who then negotiate the agreement to trade in terms of the quan-
tity of the currency and the date it is to be delivered.' The CFTC reg-
ulated exchanges use a standard form contract with the terms of quanti-
ty and date already filled in.6' The individually negotiated contracts
would not be valid under CFTC regulations, and thus they would not
have been enforceable.'
The organized exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade and
the American Exchange were hoping that Salomon Forex would be
overturned because they claim their economic welfare was in jeopar-
dy.67 In 1988, the organized exchanges held over seventy-eight percent
of the exchange market world wide, but in 1996 held only forty percent
of the market.6 The exchanges claim the decrease is due to their being
regulated. The exchanges argue that the unregulated markets are taking
business away because they don't have a cost of compliance and they
have the advantage of being able to bring new products to the market
61. See id.
62. Id. at 54.
63. See Securities Groups File High Court Brief Cautioning Against U.S. Regulation Of
Foreign Currency Transactions, WEST'S LEGAL NEws, Aug. 21, 1996, available in 1996 WL
470233, at *1.
64. See Karol & Lehman, supra note 5, at *6.
65. See id. at 3.
66. This was one of the arguments by Dr.Tauber in Salomon Forex, who contended that
since the individually negotiated contracts were not equivalent to the standard form contracts
required of the exchanges, the contracts were illegal as such and unenforceable. See generally 8
F.3d at 966.
67. See Future of Futures Trading Commission at Issue in U.S. Supreme Court Case, Leg-
islation, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 24, 1996, available in 1996 WL 536205 (blaming anti-
quated laws and explosive growth of the futures industry as the reasons for the exchanges
downfall).
68. See Vogelstein, supra note 4, at 2.
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sooner, since they have no regulatory oversight.' The exchanges felt
they would gain many of the inter-bank market participants if the inter-
bank market is regulated by the CFTC, since the exchanges are already
equipped for regulatory compliance.7'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Options are "Transactions in Foreign Currency"
Options should be read to be "transactions in foreign currency."
The two conflicting appeals court cases are the American Board of
Trade7 and the Salomon Forex72 cases. In Dunn & Delta Consul-
tants,"3 the Second Circuit was following its precedence in American
Board of Trade.
The American Board of Trade decision was not as well reasoned as
the Salomon Forex decision and the Supreme Court was correct in
overturning the Dunn case. In American Board of Trade, the court was
more concerned with the identity of the parties rather than the nature of
the trades.74 The court essentially ignored the plain language of the
amendment and relied on semantics to justify their position.75
The fact that the court would require the option to be exercised to
fall within the gambit of the amendment demonstrates a misunderstand-
ing as to the use and purpose of options contracts. That is to transfer
the risk of price movements to those willing to take the risk, and to
transfer the risk cheaply. If parties to a trade are required to exercise
the option contract in order to fall within the Treasury Amendment
exclusion, then the court has effectively taken away a very useful risk
management tool. At the outset of contract formation, the parties will
not know if the contract will be executed because they do not know
how the price of the underlying commodity will change. Thus, the par-
ties will not know whether their contract is legal or illegal. This will
effectively discontinue the use of formal options contracts by the inter-
bank market. The market instead will have to rely on futures contracts
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. 803 F.2d at 1242.
72. 8 F.3d at 966.
73. 58 F.3d at 50.
74. 803 F.2d at 1249. The court was only looking at the language which mentions financial
institutions and banks. The court made no mention of the nature of the trades being executed,
as was repeated throughout the legislative history. The court also failed to recognize that in
order for an individual to be outside the CFTC regulation, under the courts ruling, all she would
have to do is incorporate a company for the purpose of futures trading, and therefore qualify
under the exclusion of the Treasury Amendment as a "sophisticated and informed institution."
Id.
75. See id. at 1248. "An option transaction... does not become a 'transaction in' that
currency unless and until the option is exercised."
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solely, since those contracts don't have an exercise requirement. How-
ever, and this is where the courts demonstrates its misunderstanding, a
trader can reach the same effect of an option contract by simply com-
bining various types of futures contracts and creating was is commonly
referred to as a "synthetic option." Thus, the courts requirement of an
exercised option is rendered moot, because the traders can still have the
same effect as an option."
On its face, the Treasury Amendment exempts from regulation,
futures transactions in foreign currency, unless they are conducted on a
board of trade." The language does not mention limitations on the
identity of the parties of such transactions. Rather, the Treasury
Amendment creates an exemption based on where the transaction oc-
curs, not the identity of the participants."'
The Second Circuit did not consider the fact that large institutional
trades today are done not by buying and selling the bulk commodity,
but rather by buying and selling futures and options on the commodi-
ty. 9 This process is much cheaper than trading in huge quantities, as
well as much quicker to execute.' Additionally, major transfers will
not always cause market disruptions, thereby reducing the risk of loss
solely from trading in the commodity.
8 1
The court in American Board of Trade used legislative history to
support its interpretation. 2 The court found that the legislative history
revealed that futures should be considered "transactions in foreign cur-
rency." 3 However, the court felt that the descriptions of the intended
reach of the Treasury Amendment, as set forth in the legislative history
were not designed to exclude from regulation foreign currency options
transactions. 4
The court in American Board of Trade should not have made the
distinction between futures and options.8 5 Financial futures, forwards,
76. See id
77. 7 U.S.C. § 2.
78. See David S. Michell, The Treasury Amendment & Foreign Currency Forward Trans-
actions, 5 CoMMoDrrms L. LETrER 1. 5 (1985).
79. See Karol & Lehman, supra note 5, at *19.
80. See id. at 20 n.8. For example, futures provide a benefit as a cash substitute when deal-
ing with the asset itself has high trading costs or when it is cumbersome to trade the cash asset.
A "cumbersome cash asset" with high trading costs is a portfolio of all stocks traded in the
Standard & Poor's 500 Index (S&P 500). A futures trade in this portfolio is easy to make,
whereas a trade in all 500 stocks is more costly and can be difficult to execute. Id.
81. Since the inter-bank market transactions are private, the general public does not always
know of the trade, and therefore prices do not fluctuate due to supply and demand forces.
82. 803 F.2d at 1248-9.
83. See id. at 1249.
84. See id.
85. Id. Based on the courts ruling, a futures contract would be within the Treasury Amend-
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and options are all known as derivatives, because their value is a func-
tion of an underlying commodity.' Derivatives are financial tools,
their use depending on the individual's need. Options, for example, are
more commonly used when the quantity of the commodity that needs to
be hedged is uncertain. Futures are more useful when dealing with an
asset itself which has a high transaction or trading cost."' It is impor-
tant to recognize that a proper combination of options contracts is
equivalent to a futures or forward contract and vice-versa. The process
of using a combination of instruments (futures, forwards, and options)
that act like another instrument, is referred to as "financial engineer-
ing. ' 88
The situation is analogous to the following hypothetical: Govern-
ment wants to regulate all tools in a given tool box (i.e., hammer, nails,
wrench, etc.), but they wish to exclude screwdrivers from regulation.
The question then arises whether both flat-head and Phillips head
screwdrivers are exempt from regulation. The answer would clearly be
yes because there is no reason to distinguish between the two, they are
both screwdrivers. The only difference between the two is that a person
alternates their use depending on the needs in a particular circumstance.
The analysis could even go one step further and point out that in the
right circumstances, a flat-head screwdriver can be used where a Phil-
lips head is normally used, this could be called "tool engineering." The
point being, futures and options are like the screwdrivers, they are
derivations of a tool and there is no need to distinguish between them
for purposes of regulation.
The court in American Board of Trade also seemed to overlook the
fact that options on foreign currency were not common during the en-
actment of the Treasury Amendment, futures contracts were the primary
tool.89 Thus, it would not have been natural to include the word "op-
tions" in any of the legislative history materials. On the other hand,
futures and forwards have in one form or another, existed since 2000
B.C.90 In 1973 the CBOE started to trade call options on individual
ment's exclusion because a futures contract obligates the parties to deliver, unlike an option
contract where one party has the right but not the obligation to perform. In effect, the court
would presumably treat the futures contract as an exercised option that is within the scope of
the Treasury Amendment. See id.
86. See generally Karol & Lehman, supra note 5, at *4.
87. See DAIGLER, supra note 10, at 20.
88. See id. at 599.
89. See generally Karol & Lehman, supra note 5, at *3. The CBOE started trading options
in 1973, and foreign currency options were not introduced until a few years later when the
popularity of options became evident. See id.
90. See generally id. More modern forward agreements appeared in England and France by
the fourteenth century, and organized trading markets existed in Japan and Europe by the eigh-
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stocks. In that same year, Black and Scholes provided a model to deter-
mine the appropriate price for a call option. Due to popularity, the ex-
change began adding put options, stock index options, and foreign
currency options.9 Thus, the foreign currency option was not com-
monly used until the years after 1973, so it is only natural that the
legislative history would not reflect the options tool.
1. The Salomon Forex Decision
The Supreme Court was correct in following the decision of the 4th
Circuit in Salomon Forex. The court in Salomon Forex began their
analysis by looking at the language in the Act and giving plain meaning
to the phrase "transactions in foreign currency." The court concluded
that the phrase was "broad and unqualified," and the phrase "unless
conducted on a board of trade" must refer to futures, since forwards are
not typically board traded.' Since the "unless" clause refers to futures,
the court concluded that "transactions in foreign currency" must mean
"all transactions in which foreign currency is the subject matter, includ-
ing futures and options. '
The Salomon Forex court also looked at the legislative history of
the Treasury Amendment,"4 noting that Congress adopted the Treasury
Department's suggestion verbatim via the letter to the Senate commit-
tee which read, "[t]he department feels strongly that foreign exchange
futures trading, other than on organized exchanges should not be regu-
lated by the new agency."9 Thus, the court concluded that the Trea-
sury Amendment taken in its entirety, confirms "transactions in foreign
currency," should be read broadly." This conclusion was supported
additionally by the fact that the "transactions in" phrase is used else-
where in the Act to mean all transactions involving the commodity.'
The court also considered the context by which the Treasury
Amendment was created."5 The court noted that the CEA has always
regulated only futures and options and never spot or cash forwards."
Considering this fact, the 1974 Amendment would have been unneces-
teenth century. Forward trading in tulip bulbs in the 1600s was part of the speculative activity
in that commodity that resulted in a collapse of tulip prices. See id.
91. See Am. Bd. of Trade, 803 F.2d at 1242.
92. See Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 975.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 976.
96. See id.
97. See Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 976.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 975.
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sary if it did not include futures and options. " The Treasury
Amendment can only have meaning if it is interpreted to exclude some-
thing more than that which was already excluded before it was enact-
ed. °  Thus, the court in Salomon Forex read the Treasury Amend-
ment to apply to futures and option, and not solely to forwards."°
The Salomon Forex decision was correct not only because it was a
better-reasoned interpretation of the Treasury Amendment, but also
because it makes for better policy. If the CFTC was allowed jurisdic-
tion over the inter-bank market, substantial disruptions would fol-
low. 3 The vast majority of inter-bank market contracts are not in
compliance with the CFTC, so they could not be enforced. Thus, rough-
ly $650 billion would be in limbo. 4
Bank regulatory agencies already indirectly regulate the inter-bank
market."° The agencies require constant updating by the banks on
their activities in the inter-bank market."° The agencies also require
that the banks not take any speculative positions, and the banks must
maintain liquid instruments." Those inter-bank participants who are
not banks are either corporations or "sophisticated traders" who do not
need to be regulated by an agency whose underlying purpose is to
protect the general public and the naive investor."
The CFTC does not likely have the resources to effectively regulate
the inter-bank market.' 9 The inter-bank market is global in nature,
and operates twenty-four hours a day."" It is difficult to imagine that
a government agency could single-handedly regulate a market that has
no physical existence yet trades upwards of $50 billion a day."'
If the CFTC were granted jurisdiction, the increased cost of com-
pliance as well as inefficiency in the market would literally drive the
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See 8 F.3d at 975.
103. See id. at 976.
104. See Karol & Lehman, supra note 5, at *2. In the OTC market, dealers offer customized
options in response to the specific requirements of their customers. Thus, the contracts do not
meet the standard format requirement of the CFTC. See id.
105. This was pointed out in the letter from the Department of the Treasury. The Treasury
Department noted that existing regulatory responsibilities are now lodged in the Comptroller of
the Currency and the Federal Reserve. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131 supra note 25.
106. See generally Report of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, 2 COM-
MODrrY FuruitmS L. REP. (CCH) 126,247 (Oct. 19, 1994).
107. See id.
108. See S. Rep. No. 93-1131, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5843, 5887.
109. See id.
110. Laura Cohn, Forex Options Dealers Play Down Chances of More Regulation, DOW
JONES INT'L NEWS, June 4, 1996.
111. See id.
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American banks out of the business of foreign currency.' The for-
eign banks and exchanges operate free of regulation, so they would be
able to deliver cheaper trade executions at a greater efficiency than
their American counter parts who have the added cost of compli-
ance.
113
Had the Supreme Court followed American Board of Trade, these
concerns would have been devastating to the American financial com-
munity, which in turn would have effects throughout the economy.
Therefore, the Court was correct in holding that for the purposes of the
Treasury Amendment, futures and options are within the meaning of
"transactions in foreign currency."
B. The CFTC Should Still Have Jurisdiction Over Dunn & Delta
Consultants
The language of the Treasury Amendment is ambiguous when the
situation involves the general public. The court in Salomon Forex spe-
cifically avoided comment on whether the CFTC had jurisdiction when
the public was involved."4 In fact, none of the previous cases have
dealt with the situation presented in Dunn, where there was a "sophisti-
cated trader," but that trader was using funds from the general public.
The legislative history of the CFTC and the Treasury Amendment
would support an interpretation that the CFTC does have jurisdiction in
situations such as those presented in Dunn. When the CFTC was creat-
ed, the intent of Congress was to regulate all aspects of futures and
options trading."' To accomplish this, Congress gave the CFTC an
"exclusive jurisdiction" clause', and greatly expanded the definition
of "commodity."" 7 However, different regulatory agencies lobbied
for, and received, exclusions to the "exclusive jurisdiction" clause. The
end product is that the CFTC still regulates all aspects of futures and
options trading, except for the carefully carved exceptions. The Trea-
Ssury Amendment was one of the carefully carved exceptions, the intent
of which was to preserve the bank regulation of off-exchange foreign
currency transactions by banks and sophisticated traders. If the activities
of Dunn are excluded by the Treasury Amendment, then they effective-
ly are unsupervised, this is clearly not the intent of Congress. Congress
wanted everyone under some sort of regulatory umbrella. Thus, the
Treasury Amendment was meant to exclude banks and sophisticated
112. See generally Morrison, supra note 2.
113. See generally Bob Drummond, Court to Rule on Currency Options, THE COMMERCIAL
APPEAL, May 29, 1996, available in 1996 WL 9907925.
114. 8 F.3d at 978.
115. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6c, 23; See also text accompanying note 21.
116. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(ii).
117. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1(a)(3), 2.
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traders, not necessarily the entire inter-bank market and all of its partic-
ipants.
The Treasury Amendment was enacted in 1974, when computers
were not as widely used as they are today. Congress could not possibly
have seen the impact that computers would have on futures and options
trading."' In 1974, the banks and traders in the inter-bank market
were making trades primarily over the phone. This is significant be-
cause in order to place a trade, a market participant would have to call
another trader, who would either take the trade, or call another trader
who might. Thus, the market participants were at least aware of who
they were trading with if they did not know them personally." 9 Trad-
ers who did not regularly trade in the inter-bank market would have
found it difficult to trade because they were outsiders to the market,
they represented a greater credit risk if their trade lost money."n Thus,
it would have been extremely difficult for a small trader or naive in-
vestor to enter the inter-bank market. This is possibly why the CFTC
ceded jurisdiction so easily, because the people they wanted to protect
(small traders and investors) were not in any danger of being victimized
by the inter-bank market.
Today, computers have eased the trading process greatly. Traders
in the inter-bank market today often may have no idea as to the identity
of the other party. Computers have effectively allowed anyone with a
bank account and a modem to enter the inter-bank market, and such
was not the case when the Treasury Amendment was enacted. Congress
could not have possibly conceived a day when a person sitting in their
home could trade on the inter-bank market. Had Congress known of the
impact computers would have, they would not have tried to exclude
banks and sophisticated traders from CFTC jurisdiction simply by clas-
sifying their activities as "off-exchange." Congress wanted the CFTC to
help protect the small traders and individuals, who would trade on the
organized exchanges. If Congress had foreseen a day when the public
could access the off-exchange market, then they would have drafted the
Treasury Amendment entirely differently.
The driving force behind the creation of the CFTC was to curtail
the fraud and trading abuses that victimized the public and small
traders.' The Treasury Department, in drafting the Treasury Amend-
ment, drew a distinction between the "informal network of banks and
dealers" intended to be excluded and "the participants on organized ex-
changes." While it could be said that Dunn was a sophisticated trader, it
118. See generally Karol & Lehman, supra note 5, at *2.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, §§ 5(4c), 49 Stat. 1491.
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still remains that he was trading on behalf of people who would fall
under the classification of "participants on organized exchanges," in
other words, the general public. Therefore, it was not the trading activi-
ties of Dunn that brought him under the jurisdiction of the CFTC, but
rather his marketing to the public, that makes him susceptible to CFTC
jurisdiction. The CFTC has always understood this, and expressly stated
their position in a congressional notice in 1985.122 In the notice, the
CFTC expressly stated that persons marketing off-exchange transactions
to the public would not fall under the Treasury Amendment's exclusion
to CFTC jurisdiction.' Dunn himself was a sophisticated trader and
experienced inter-bank market participant and it is unlikely that he
honestly felt he was outside all regulations. The players in the market
know that just because they are "in" the market, this does not mean
they are "outside" regulation.
V. CONCLUSION
Futures and options are nearly equivalent financial tools and there
is no reason to distinguish between them. Thus the Supreme Court was
correct in ruling that for purposes of the Treasury Amendment, options
are to be considered "transactions in foreign currency .... ." However,
the Court could have went one step further and held that Dunn was still
under the jurisdiction of the CFTC due to his actions in marketing to
the general public.
The Treasury Amendment itself is antiquated at best. Congress has
failed the financial community by not updating the amendment to re-
flect the current state of the industry, and the court must now decide
how to handle the situation based on what Congress originally intended
over twenty years ago. To provide guidance for lower courts, the Su-
preme Court should have advocated a three-part test. The first prong
would ask whether the transaction was based on foreign currency. The
second prong would look at the nature of the trade; is the transaction
off-exchange, does it take place in the OTC market? Thirdly, the court
should ask if the true party in interest is a bank, institution, or sophisti-
cated trader? If the answer to any of the prongs is no, then the CFTC
would have jurisdiction over the party. This would still allow the banks
and sophisticated traders to trade free of regulatory oversight, while at
the same time allow the CFTC to curtail fraud and abuse.




What Would Have Been the Impact of Such a Decision?
A decision by the Supreme Court allowing the CFTC jurisdiction
over Dunn in this particular instance, would arguably have been in the
best interest of most concerned (with the exception of Dunn). Mutual
funds, pension funds, and various other investment pools would not be
allowed out of CFTC oversight. This is exactly as Congress intended,
the use of futures and options by the general public should be regulated
by the CFTC.1 " Businesses would use the inter-bank market without
CFTC oversight if the use is for business purposes (such as an overseas
accounts receivable) under the business exception." However, busi-
nesses with shareholders, established for the sole purpose of derivatives
trading, could not trade without CFTC oversight, unless their corpora-
tion is regulated by another agency whose jurisdiction is recognized by
the CFTC (e.g. banks). This keeps small traders and the general public
on the organized exchanges and thus under the regulatory umbrella of
the CFTC, while at the same time allowing the banks, institutions, and
sophisticated traders to continue their operations free of oversight.
The organized exchanges would have likely protested such a deci-
sion. However, it is important to note that while the exchanges have
lost market share, it is not necessarily due to their being regulated. The
futures and options market has literally exploded with growth in the
past few years. It should be noted that forty percent of a $50 billion
daily market is still more than seventy-eight percent of a $20 billion
market, so the market share argument is somewhat mischaracterized.
Additionally, financial products are easily duplicated and cannot be
patented, so the situation is such that there exists a booming market
with comparatively low barriers to entry for foreign exchanges. It is
only natural that there be a significant increase in competition by for-
eign exchanges. The American exchanges should take note of the fact
that, often the reason traders use American exchanges is because they
are so regulated. In a sense, the American exchanges have an advantage
over foreign exchanges because American exchanges are more credible,
which is a direct result of their being so closely regulated.
Congress is currently attempting to pass a bill entitled "The Com-
modity Exchange Act Amendments of 1997," that implicitly would
follow similar guidelines. Congress dealt with the third prong of the
analysis by defining a person who markets to the general public as a
board of trade, and therefore under the regulation of the CFTC.126
124. See generally Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, ch. 545, §§ 5(4c), 49 Stat. 1491.
125. See Vogelstein, supra note 16, at C14.
126. The Commodity Exchange Act Amendment of 1997, S. 256, 105th Cong. (1997). The
amendment is currently pending in the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry.
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While the Supreme Court was burdened with the responsibility of
deciding the case before it, the ultimate burden of ensuring a smooth
operation of the country's financial affairs is on Congress and the
administrative agencies of Government. If the agencies cannot reach an
agreement, then it is Congress that must take the initiative of reforming
not only the Treasury Amendment, but also the CFTC regulatory frame-
work. It is up to Congress to bring the CFTC into the '90's and be-
yond, not our judicial system.
Jason A. Pinson
